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This thesis explores the use of unsupervised machine learning for spectrum
sensing in cognitive radio (CR) networks from a security perspective. CR is an
enabling technology for dynamic spectrum access (DSA) because of a CR’s ability
to reconfigure itself in a smart way. CR can adapt and use unoccupied spectrum
with the help of spectrum sensing and DSA. DSA is an efficient way to dynamically
allocate white spaces (unutilized spectrum) to other CR users in order to tackle the
spectrum scarcity problem and improve spectral efficiency. So far various techniques
have been developed to efficiently detect and classify signals in a DSA environment.
Neural network techniques, especially those using unsupervised learning have some
key advantages over other methods mainly because of the fact that minimal pre-
configuration is required to sense the spectrum. However, recent results have shown
some possible security vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by adversarial users
to gain unrestricted access to spectrum by fooling signal classifiers. It is very im-
portant to address these new classes of security threats and challenges in order to
make CR a long-term commercially viable concept.
This thesis identifies some key security vulnerabilities when unsupervised ma-
chine learning is used for spectrum sensing and also proposes mitigation techniques
to counter the security threats. The simulation work demonstrates the ability of
malicious user to manipulate signals in such a way to confuse signal classifier. The
signal classifier is forced by the malicious user to draw incorrect decision boundaries
by presenting signal features which are akin to a primary user. Hence, a malicious
user is able to classify itself as a primary user and thus gains unrivaled access to
the spectrum. First, performance of various classification algorithms are evaluated.
K-means and weighted classification algorithms are selected because of their ro-
bustness against proposed attacks as compared to other classification algorithm.
Second, connection attack, point cluster attack, and random noise attack are shown
to have an adverse effect on classification algorithms. In the end, some mitigation
techniques are proposed to counter the effect of these attacks.
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With the growth of wireless communication technologies the competition for
access to electromagnetic spectrum has increased. In order to use the electromag-
netic spectrum in an efficient manner a new spectrum sharing technique known as
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) was proposed [1]. DSA aims to dynamically allo-
cate spectrum for efficient utilization. This is done by sensing the frequency band
for possible white spaces (unoccupied spectrum). The field of spectrum sensing has
grown significantly over the past five years, with the growth of cognitive radio tech-
nology. Spectrum sensing is required for DSA, spectral awareness, interoperability,
and many other smart radio applications [2].
1.1 Spectrum Reform
The radio spectrum is very limited as compared to ever increasing bandwidth
requirements of communication technologies. Moreover, in order to keep the trans-
mission interference-free, an exclusive spectrum band is alloted per user which results
in an inefficient use of spectrum. The inefficiency is due to the underutilization of
spectrum. Some traditional occupants of spectrum are shown in Figure 1.1 [3]. Most
of these occupants do not use the spectrum all the time, so if the idle spectrum can



























Figure 1.1: Radio spectrum licensed to traditional communication systems
Internationally frequency allocation or licensing is done by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) which is the United Nations (UN) agency for in-
formation and communication technologies. The radio communication sector for
ITU (ITU-R) is responsible for economical, efficient, and rational use of spectrum
all over the world. ITU-R sets guidelines that helps countries regulate their spec-
trum. However, nations have the liberty for spectrum use within their boundaries.
In the United States of America (USA), spectrum is regulated by Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) and National Telecommunication and Information
Administration (NTIA). The FCC, which is an independent regulatory agency, ad-
ministers spectrum for non-Federal use (i.e. state, local government, commercial,
private internal business, and personal use) and the NTIA, which is an operating
unit of the Department of Commerce, administers spectrum for Federal use (e.g.
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use by the Military, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI)). The Spectrum Policy Task Group of the FCC has set three
guidelines for the efficient spectrum utilization [4]:
a. improve access in space, time, and frequency;
b. enable flexible regulation in permitting controlled access to license spectrum,
and
c. stimulate efficient spectrum usage through policies.
Possible solutions to the problem of spectrum scarcity is cognitive radios and
dynamic spectrum access. It can accommodate ever increasing data rich wireless
communication systems by efficient utilization of spectrum. Cognitive radios would
autonomously regulate the spectrum with the help of dynamic spectrum access.
1.2 President’s Broadband Policy
Historically, the FCC’s approach to allocating spectrum has been to formulate
policy on a band-by-band, service-by-service basis, typically in response to specific
requests for service allocations or station assignments. This approach has been crit-
icized for being ad-hoc, overly prescriptive, and unresponsive to changing market
needs. The new National Broadband Plan aims to open up vast tracts of underuti-
lized spectrum, not only for licensing by auction, but also for shared and unlicensed
use. The plan aims to reallocate 500 megahertz (MHz) of wireless spectrum in the
next ten years for mobile, fixed, and unlicensed broadband, of which 300 MHz be-
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tween 225 MHz and 3.7 gigahertz (GHz) should be made newly available for mobile
use within five years [5]. This spectrum would be made available for a variety of
licensed and unlicensed flexible commercial use, as well as to meet the broadband
needs of specialized users such as public safety, emergency, educational, and other
important users. It is notable that the plan recommends the allocation of a new
contiguous band of unlicensed spectrum, as well as the rapid implementation of
unlicensed access to the unused TV channels known as white spaces [5].
1.3 Military/Defense Requirements
The military is one of the first adopters of cognitive radio technology, with the
launch of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Next Gen-
eration Communication (XG) program [6]. However, there are many open issues
still to be addressed. The XG program goals are to develop both the enabling
technologies and system concepts to dynamically redistribute allocated spectrum
along with novel waveforms in order to provide dramatic improvements in assured
military communications in support of a full range of worldwide deployments [6].
US forces face unique spectrum access issues in each country in which they oper-
ate, due to competing civilian or government users of national spectrum. The XG
program approach is to develop the theoretical underpinnings for dynamic control
of the spectrum, and the technologies and subsystems that enable reallocation of
the spectrum. The proposed program goals are to develop, integrate, and evaluate
the technology to enable equipment to automatically select spectrum and operating
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modes to both minimize disruption of existing users, and to ensure operation of US
systems. The result of the XG program will be to develop and demonstrate a set
of standard dynamic spectrum adaption technologies for legacy and future emitter
systems for joint service utility [6].
One of the problems of significant importance is security in cognitive radio
systems. Considering the military use of this system the security aspect becomes
even more important.
1.4 Motivation
Numerous techniques have been developed to efficiently detect and classify
signals in DSA environments. A major area of study has been the use of neural
networks for classifying features extracted from signals. Previous work shows the
usefulness of machine learning to cognitive radio in signal classification [7, 8]. Re-
search presented in this thesis points out key security issues related to the use of
machine learning in cognitive radio networks, specifically related to spectrum sens-
ing attacks, and attacks that can fool signal classifiers. Unsupervised learning is
powerful in the sense that minimal preconfiguration is required and radios can learn
the properties of other devices in their environment. However, an adversary can also
learn the properties of the network thus compromising the security of the network.
This thesis explores attacks against signal classifiers and their mitigation techniques




The field of radio architecture has recently undergone a revolution of design,
significantly enabled by Moore’s law of computational evolution, where sufficient
computational resources are available in Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) and Gen-
eral Purpose Processors (GPPs) to implement the modulation and demodulation,
and all the signaling protocols of a radio as a software application. With the ex-
ponential growth in the ways and means by which people need to communicate
(data communications, voice communications, video communications, broadcast
messaging, command and control communications, and emergency response com-
munications) modifying radio devices easily and cost-effectively has become busi-
ness critical. Commercial wireless communication industry is currently facing prob-
lems due to constant evolution of link-layer protocol standards (e.g. 2.5G, 3G,
4G, and beyond) and existence of incompatible wireless network technologies (e.g.
WiFi, WiMax, IEEE 802.22, and others) in different countries inhibiting deploy-
ment of global roaming facilities. This has led to problems in rolling-out new ser-
vices/features due to wide-spread presence of legacy subscriber handsets. Software
Defined Radios (SDRs), or its more advanced form Cognitive Radios (CRs), offer
solution to this problem. CR technology, in which one radio or even a network of
radios are able to learn a successful degree of adaptability, that aids the user, the
6
network, and/or the spectrum owner. As new services are offered, more spectrum
will be needed. CR will provide the means for radios to communicate with greater
spectrum efficiency.
This chapter introduces Software Defined Radios (SDRs) and their typical
architecture; Cognitive Radios (CRs), their architecture, and network(s) composed
of CRs; Machine Learning (ML) and their usefulness in spectrum sensing for CRs;
and Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA).
2.1 Software Defined Radios
A Software Defined Radio (SDR) is a general-purpose transceiver which sup-
ports multiple air interfaces, protocols, coding, and modulation schemes. More-
over, it is reconfigurable via software which runs on Field Programmable Gate Ar-
rays (FPGA), Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC), GPPs, or DSPs [9].
SDRs have transformed future wireless communication devices. In the past, tra-
ditional hardware-dependent communication devices had to be changed/upgraded
from scratch for new technology as they offered no software control. They were
fixed in functions and control. By contrast, SDR technology provides an efficient
and comparatively inexpensive solution to this problem. SDR allows multi-mode,
multi-band, and/or multi-functional wireless devices that can be enhanced using
software upgrades. Though the term SDR was first used by Joseph Mitola [10],
it has been in use in the defense sector since the 1970’s. The early 1990’s saw















Figure 2.1: A Typical SDR Receiver.
a program called SPEAKeasy [11]. With the success of SPEAKeasy this technol-
ogy gradually morphed from Speakeasy to Programmable Modular Communication
Systems (PMCS), to Digital Modular Radio (DMR) [12], and to the Joint Tactical
Radio Systems (JTRS) [13, 14]. SDRs have significant utility for the military and
commercial cell phone services, both of which must serve a wide variety of changing
radio protocols in real time. SDR technology brings the flexibility, cost efficiency,
and power to drive communications forward. SDR has wide-reaching benefits real-
ized by service providers, product developers, and end users [13].
2.1.1 Architecture of SDR
Figure 2.1 shows a typical SDR receiver. Some of the basic building blocks
of any SDR are its antenna(s), duplexer and diplexer, radio-frequency (RF) filter,
low noise amplifier (LNA), image reject and intermediate-frequency (IF) filter, RF
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mixer, local oscillator (LO), automatic gain control (AGC), analog-to-digital (ADC)
and digital-to-analog (DAC) converters. These building blocks are further discussed
in the following sections:
• Antennas: Antenna design and selection is very crucial for any wireless de-
vice. For a SDR, which is designed to support multiple bands, the antenna
choice becomes even more critical. So, an antenna which is capable of operat-
ing over a large band is desired for SDR [13].
• Duplexer and Diplexer: A duplexer is used to separate transmitted and
received signals in a common frequency range that uses a common antenna.
Where as, the diplexer isolates the transmitted and received signals in dis-
tinct frequency ranges. SDR that support multiple modes, such as full-duplex
and half-duplex systems, require a duplexer or diplexer that works for both
systems, which is a significant design challenge [13].
• RF Filter: This initial filter after the duplexer rejects out-of-band interfer-
ence. It can also help isolate the receiver from the transmitted signal. This
filter should have low loss and provide as much selectivity, as feasible, as pos-
sible without limiting the bandwidth needed to support multiple modes of the
SDR [13].
• Low Noise Amplifier (LNA): The LNA boosts the signal power level into
a range compatible with other components in the circuit. The primary design
challenge is to maximize gain without adding excessive noise into signal, but
this must be traded for power consumption and dynamic range [13].
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• Image Reject and IF filter: The image reject filter reduces noise and
protects the mixer from interference, including any signals located at the image
frequency, which, after conversion, may lie in the same band as the desired
signal [13].
• RF Mixer: The RF mixer is used to down-convert signal and can be a major
source of inter-modulation distortion since it is, by its very nature, a non-
linear device. Increasing the local oscillator power to the mixer is one way to
improve linearity and to reduce distortion, but it reduces the battery life of
portable devices. Active RF mixers can also be a source of noise [13].
• Local Oscillator (LO): The mixer is driven by a LO whose frequency de-
termines the channel selection. This LO should have a good tuning range and
good phase stability to minimize the contributions of phase noise to the noise
floor. Thermal noise will also contribute to the noise floor. Power consumption
can be a major design issue for LO [13].
• Automatic Gain Control (AGC): The AGC is primarily used to ensure
that signal has a voltage level that is compatible and makes best use of the
input range of ADC. The AGC should be fast enough to account for changing
signal levels. It ensures that minimal noise is injected into the system and
signal is not clipped by the ADC, which would create non-linear distortion.
An AGC should have fast response in order to handle rapid variations of signal
levels in situations where fast channel fading is present [13].
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• ADC Converter: The ADC must sample a real signal at a rate that is at least
twice the bandwidth of the signal, and in the case of multi-mode receivers, the
highest bandwidth signal dictates sampling rate. Moreover, different signaling
standards require different amounts of dynamic range. This makes the design
of ADC for SDR more challenging [13].
2.2 Cognitive Radios
Cognitive Radio (CR) is an emerging technology to realize wireless devices with
cognition capabilities such as learning, sensing, awareness, and reasoning. They of-
fer global seamless connectivity and solve the interoperability issues among various
wireless standards. CRs are a more advanced form of SDRs. They are built on SDR
platforms but with additional intelligence. In fact, SDR is a key enabling technology
to realize a CR. FCC defines CR as ”A radio or system that senses its operational
electromagnetic environment and can dynamically and autonomously adjust its ra-
dio operating parameters to modify system operation, such as maximize throughput,
mitigate interference, facilitate interoperability, and access secondary markets” [15].
Hence, they are context aware, they sense and adapt to an ever-changing commu-
nication environment. CRs can generally be classified as policy-based or learning
radios [8]. In policy based CR, we observe the environment and by reasoning de-
termine how to optimally operate, for example, by switching modulation scheme if
signal strength increases/decreases [16]. Learning CRs usually are equipped with


























Figure 2.2: Cognitive radio architecture showing interaction between software radio,
knowledge base, and policy and learning engines.
a knowledge base from experience, and is not dependent on hard rules for decision
making as in policy based radios [8]. The learning algorithms could be based on
hidden Markov models [17], neural networks [18], or genetic algorithms [19].
Some commercially available CR hardware and software platforms are: GNU
Radio [20], Universal Software Peripheral Radio (USRP) [21], and XG Radio by
Shared Spectrum [22].
2.2.1 Cognitive Radio Architecture
Figure 2.2 [8], shows a generic CR architecture and the interaction between
various components. CR is often thought as an extension to SDR. It adds additional
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functionalities to SDR like cognition, knowledge base, reasoning engine, and learning
engine. A well defined application programming interface (API) dictates commu-
nication between the cognitive engine and the software radio. The software radio
exports variables that are either read-only or read-write. The read-only parameters
represent statistics maintained by the software radio, such as signal-to-noise ration
or bit error rate. The read-write variables represent configurable parameters such
as transmit power, coding rate, or symbol constellation [8]. Knowledge base is ra-
dio’s long term memory and helps cognitive engine generate conclusions based on
information defined in it. The learning engine is responsible for manipulating the
knowledge base from experience. The reasoning engine uses planning, which is a
field of AI that works with logic [8].
2.3 Cognitive Radio Networks
Current communication networks limit network’s ability to adapt, often re-
sulting in sub-optimal performance. The common network elements (consisting of
nodes, protocol layers, policies, and behaviors) are unable to make optimal adapta-
tions with changing network conditions thus resulting in poor performance. Cogni-
tive networks promise to remove these limitations by allowing networks to observe,
act, and learn in order to optimize the performance. Cognitive networks are defined
by [23] as ”... a network with a cognitive process that can perceive current network
conditions, and then plan, decide and act on those conditions. The network can
learn from these adaptations and use them to make future decisions, all while tak-
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ing into account end-to-end goals.” Cognitive networks are different from cognitive
radios in many ways. Cognitive networks aim for end-to-end network performance,
whereas cognitive radio’s goals are localized only to the radio’s user. Here, end-to-
end denotes all the network elements involved in the transmission of a data flow.
A cognitive network should provide, over an extended period of time, better
end-to-end performance than a non-cognitive network. Cognition could be used
to improve resource management, quality of service (QoS), security, access con-
trol, and/or many other network goals. Cognitive networks are only limited by the
adaptability of the underlying network elements and the flexibility of the cognitive
framework. In this manner, cognitive networks are not limited to only wireless
networks. Ad-hoc networks, infrastructure-mode wireless networks, fully wired net-
works and heterogeneous networks are also candidates for cognitive network design
[23]. The cost associated with rolling out a cognitive network must be outweighed
by the performance improvement the cognitive network provides. The end-to-end
goals are what gives a cognitive network its network-wide scope, separating it from
other technologies, which have only a local, single element scope [2].
Cognitive networks require a Software Adaptable Network (SAN) to imple-
ment the actual network functionality and allow the cognitive process to adapt the
network. Similar to a cognitive radio, which depends on an SDR to modify aspects
of radio operation (e.g. time, frequency, bandwidth, code, spatiality, and waveform),
a SAN depends on a network that has one or more adjustable elements [23]. Practi-
cally, this means that a network may be able to modify one or several layers of the
network stack in its member nodes. A simple example of a SAN could be a wireless
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network with directional antennas (antennas with the ability to scan their receive
or transmit strength to various points of rotation). A more complex example would
involve more modifiable aspects at various layers of protocol stack, such as routing
control or Medium Access Control (MAC) [23].
2.4 Machine Learning
In a machine learning environment, a machine changes its structure, program
or data (based on its inputs or in response to external observations) in such a manner
that its expected future performance improves. It refers to changes in systems
that perform tasks associated with AI. Commonly, machine learning systems are
classified on the basis of the underlying learning strategies used. Camastra and
Vinciarelli in [24] identify four different learning types: rote learning, learning from
instruction, learning by analogy, and learning from examples. The focus in this
thesis is machine learning from examples. Given a set of examples of a concept, the
learner induces a general concept description that describe the examples. The three
main ways to learn from examples are: supervised learning, reinforcement learning,
and unsupervised learning [24].
2.4.1 Supervised Learning
In Supervised Learning, the data is a sample of input-output patterns often
called the training sample or training set. The task is to find a deterministic function
that maps any input to an output that can predict future input-output observations,
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and minimize the errors as much as possible. Examples of this learning tasks are the
recognition of handwritten letters and digits, the prediction of stock markets and
many more [24]. Supervised learning can further be distinguished in classification
learning and regression learning depending on the output. In classification learning,
each element of output space is called a class. The output space has no structure
except whether two elements of the output are equal or not. On the other hand, if the
output space is formed by the values of continuous variables then the learning task
is known as the problem of regression or function learning [25]. Typical examples
of regression are to predict the values of shares in the stock exchange market and
to estimate the values of physical measure (e.g. temperature) in a section of a
thermoelectric plant.
2.4.2 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning has its roots in control theory. It considers the scenario
of a dynamic environment that results in state-action-reward triples as the data.
The difference between reinforcement learning and supervised learning is that in
reinforcement learning no optimal action exists in a given state, but the learning
algorithm must identify an action in order to maximize the expected reward over
time. The concise description of data is the strategy that maximizes the reward.
The problem of reinforcement learning is to learn what to do, i.e. how to map
situations to actions, in order to maximize a given reward. Unlike a supervised
learning task, the learning algorithm is not told which actions to take in a given
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situation. Instead, the learner is assumed to gain information about the actions
taken by some reward not necessarily arriving immediately after the action is taken.
An example of such a problem is learning to play chess. A comprehensive survey on
reinforcement learning can be found in [26].
2.4.3 Unsupervised Learning
If the data is only a sample of objects without associated target values, the
problem is known as unsupervised learning. In unsupervised learning there is no
teacher. Here a concise description of the data can be a set of clusters or a probability
density stating how likely it is to observe a certain object in the future. A general
way to represent data is to specify a similarity between any pair of objects. If two
objects share much structure, it should be possible to reproduce data from the same
prototype. This idea underlies clustering algorithms that form a rich subclass of
unsupervised algorithms. The clustering algorithms aim to find grouping of the
objects such that similar objects belong to the same cluster while keeping the the
number of clusters fixed. Typical examples of unsupervised learning tasks include
the problem of image and text segmentation, and the task of novelty detection in
process control [24].
In addition to clustering algorithms, unsupervised learning techniques have
algorithms whose aim is to represent high-dimensionality data in low-dimension
spaces, trying to preserve the original information of data. These techniques are
often called feature selection or dimensionality reduction methods [24]. The use of
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more dimensions than necessary leads to several problems. The first one is the space
needed to store the data. The speed of algorithms using the data depends on the
dimension of the vectors, so a reduction in dimensionality can result in reduced
computation time. An example of feature selection algorithm is Self Organizing
Maps [27].
2.4.4 Applications of Machine Learning for Spectrum Sensing
Traditional spectrum sensing techniques are computationally complex and re-
quire significant amount of observation time for adequate performance [7]. Machine
learning is a powerful tool which when used in conjunction with CR has promising
results for DSA [8]. Signal classifiers can be designed which can do most of the work
offline thus reducing online computation. This results in better and quick sensing
decisions. Recently, researchers have used supervised, unsupervised, and reinforce-
ment learning for spectrum sensing. Supervised learning requires prior training in
order to accurately classify the signals. The supervised learning include the K-
nearest neighbor algorithm [28], support vector machines [29], and neural networks
[30]. Neural networks have long been considered for pattern recognition and signal
classification [30], and have proven to be robust to a variety of conditions such as
interfering signals and noise [31]. Researchers have also used Q-learning algorithm
of reinforcement learning for spectrum sensing. Mo Lin et al in [32] showed the use
of Q-learning for spectrum sensing without the use of any channel state information
for estimation of primary traffic. Reddy in [33] has discussed the use of Q-learning
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for detection of known and unknown signals.
This thesis demonstrates the use of unsupervised machine learning for spec-
trum sensing for the first time [34, 35]. Unlike supervised learning, unsupervised
learning does not need any training data for signal classification. The examples
of unsupervised learning include K-means clustering [36] and self-organizing maps
[27]. The applications of machine learning especially the unsupervised learning for
Cognitive Radios and DSA are further discussed in Chapter 3.
2.5 Dynamic Spectrum Access
Data transmitted through a wireless channel is not limited to voice any more.
With the growth and development of multimedia rich content, the demand for ad-
ditional spectrum has increased. This has given rise to the problem of spectrum
scarcity. But actually, at any given time and location, much of the prized spectrum
lies idle. This paradox indicates that spectrum shortage results from the spectrum
management policy rather than the physical scarcity of usable frequencies. Tra-
ditional approaches of static spectrum allocation are becoming obsolete with the
growth in demand of spectrum for high date rate applications. A possible solution
to this problem is dynamically sharing spectrum among many users. The utilization
of spectrum by different users can be put in two categories: a user having higher
preference called as the Primary User, and other users wishing to opportunistically
access the spectrum called Secondary Users. Secondary users have less preference
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Figure 2.3: A Taxonomy of Dynamic Spectrum Access.
the spectrum and leases out the spectrum to any secondary user when it is unused,
given that when the need arises to use the spectrum the secondary user has to vacate
the spectrum.
One of the key advantages of CR is that they are not dependent on any fixed
license band, they can be reconfigured to any available frequency band. Thus CR
offers a solution to efficient utilization of scarce spectrum by dynamically allocating
the spectrum. The DSA strategies can be broadly categorized under three models
according to Figure 2.3 [37], which are discussed in the following sections.
2.5.1 Dynamic Exclusive Use Model
This model allows the spectrum band to be licensed to services for exclusive
use. The main idea is to introduce flexibility to improve spectrum efficiency. The
two approaches proposed under this model are: Spectrum property rights [38] and
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dynamic spectrum allocation [39]. The former approach allows licensees to sell
and trade spectrum and to freely choose technology. The second approach, dynamic
spectrum allocation, was brought forth by the European DRiVE project [39]. It aims
to improve spectrum efficiency through dynamic spectrum assignment by exploiting
the spatial and temporal traffic statistics of different services. In other words, in a
given region and at a given time, spectrum is allocated to services for exclusive use.
Based on an exclusive-use model, these approaches cannot eliminate white space in
spectrum resulting from the bursty nature of wireless traffic [37].
2.5.2 Open Sharing Model
This model employs open sharing of spectrum among users in a spectral re-
gion. It is also known as spectral commons [40]. This spectrum management model
supports centralized [41] and distributed [42] sensing. This model is highly success-
ful for wireless services operating in the unlicensed industrial, scientific, and medical
(ISM) radio band (e.g., WiFi).
2.5.3 Hierarchical Access Model
This model opens licensed spectrum to secondary users while limiting interfer-
ence perceived by primary users. This is done on a hierarchical basis. This model
supports two approaches for spectrum sharing between primary and secondary user.
They are spectrum underlay and spectrum overlay [37]. The spectrum underlay ap-
proach imposes severe constraints on the transmission power of secondary users so
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that they operate below the noise floor of primary users. By spreading transmitted
signals over a ultra-wide frequency band (UWB), secondary users can potentially
achieve short-range high data rate with extremely low transmission power. Based
on a worst-case assumption that primary users transmit all the time, this approach
does not rely on detection and exploitation of spectrum white space. Spectrum
overlay was first proposed by Mitola [43] under the term spectrum pooling and then
investigated by the DARPA Next Generation (XG) [6] program under the term op-
portunistic spectrum access. Differing from spectrum underlay, this approach does
not necessarily impose severe restrictions on the transmission power of secondary
users, but rather on when and where they may transmit. It directly targets at spa-
tial and temporal spectrum white space by allowing secondary users to identify and
exploit local and instantaneous spectrum availability in a non-intrusive manner [37].
Compared to the dynamic exclusive use and open sharing models, this hierar-
chical model is perhaps the most compatible with the current spectrum management




One of the primary requirement of CRs is their ability to scan the entire
band for the presence/absence of primary users. This process is called Spectrum
Sensing. It is performed locally by a secondary user or collectively by a group of
secondary users. Spectrum Sensing is characterized by the join of a quantitative
and qualitative analysis of a reference band through the collection of information in
terms of frequency usage and air interface classification at a used frequency [44]. The
aim is to identify idle spectrum bands/slots known as white spaces. The available
spectrum bands are then analyzed to determine their suitability for communication
in-terms of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), error rate, delays, interference, and fading.
This chapter discusses types of spectrum sensing, challenges associated in sensing
the spectrum, some common spectrum sensing methods, and security in spectrum
sensing.
3.1 Challenges
The task of sensing the spectrum accurately and efficiently comes with many
challenges, which are discussed in this section.
A. Hardware requirements:





























































Figure 3.1: Various Aspects of Spectrum Sensing for CR.
to digital converters, high speed signal processor, and multiple analog front end
circuitry. Unlike traditional receivers, the CR terminals are required to process
transmission over a much wider radio frequency (RF) band. This imposes
further constraints on the design of antennas and power amplifiers. In order to
keep the delay factor as small as possible, high speed processing units (DSPs or
FPGAs) are required to execute computationally demanding signal processing
tasks. Two commonly used architectures for spectrum sensing are: single-
radio and dual-radio [45, 46]. The single-radio architecture allots a specific
time slot for spectrum sensing. This architecture is very low cost and simple
to implement. However, due to the limited sensing duration, accuracy can not
be guaranteed. Also, since some time slots are used for sensing rather than
sending data, this approach is not spectrally efficient [47, 48]. On the other
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hand, dual-radio architecture offers separate channels for data transmission
and spectrum sensing [49, 50]. Both tasks are executed simultaneously. This
approach offers better spectrum efficiency but more power is consumed and
expensive hardware is required.
B. Hidden Primary User
The hidden primary user problem is similar to the hidden node problem (occurs
when a node is visible from a wireless access point (AP), but not from other
nodes communicating with said AP) in Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA).
Some possible factors leading to this problem are severe multipath fading
observed by secondary users while scanning for primary users’ transmission.
This problem can be solved by using cooperative sensing [51].
C. Spread Spectrum Users:
If the primary user is a Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) device (or
any spread spectrum user), its frequency is spread over wide area and its
challenging to predict user/detect its frequency if its frequency hop pattern
and synchronization scheme is not known before hand [52].
D. Sensing Duration and Frequency:
The primary user should be detected as soon as it wants to occupy the channel
otherwise it would result in interference. The secondary user must detect the
presence of primary user in a timely fashion and thus vacate the spectrum in
order to avoid interference. Hence, sensing methods should be able to identify
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presence of primary user within a certain duration. This requirement poses a
limit on the performance of sensing algorithm and creates a challenge for CR
design. The effect of sensing time on the performance of CR is investigated in
[53]. Sensing frequency, i.e. how often CR should perform spectrum sensing,
is a design parameter that needs to be chosen carefully depending upon the
temporal characteristics of primary user in the environment [54].
E. Other factors:
In addition to above challenges, spectrum sensing algorithms have to be ro-
bust, secure, resource efficient, simple to implement, able to support multiple
secondary users, power efficient, and resilient to multipath fading [2].
3.2 Types of Spectrum Sensing
The radio spectrum can be sensed by either one cognitive radio or different ra-
dios can collaborate and share the information about the spectrum utilization. This
approach to sense the spectrum can solve the problem of sensing time, shadowing,
noise uncertainty, probability of miss classification, and the hidden primary user
problem which are very common in a spectrum sensing environment [51, 55, 56].
Some of the challenges in this approach is to come up with efficient algorithms
which are good at sharing the information in a time efficient manner, have reduced
complexity and the problem of having a control channel [57]. The following sec-




In cooperative sensing architectures, the control channel can be implemented
using different methodologies. These include a dedicated band, unlicensed band
(such as Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM)), and underlay Ultra Wideband
(UWB) system [58]. One of these methods can be selected depending on the system
requirements. The shared spectrum decisions can be soft or hard decisions made by
each CR [59]. Cooperative sensing can be implemented in two fashions: centralized
or distributed [1]. These methods are explained in the next two sections.
3.2.2 Centralized Sensing
In centralized sensing, a central agent is given the task of handling and dis-
patching knowledge of spectrum, i.e. identification of available spectrum, which it
gets from other participating CRs. The hard (binary) sensing results are gathered at
a central place which is known as Access Point (AP) in [55]. The main disadvantage
is dependency on a single centralized agent, any problem with this can easily mess
up the whole system. On the other hand, centralized sensing promises considerable
performance gains over other sensing methods [60].
3.2.3 Distributed Sensing
In distributed sensing, CRs share information among themselves but when it
comes to decisions they make their own decisions as to which part of spectrum to
occupy/vacate. In application scenarios involving geographically distributed radios,
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such as a wireless communication system, distributed spectrum sensing approaches
are worth considering due to the variability of the radio signal [46, 52, 55]. Such
methods may significantly increase the reliability of the spectrum estimation process,
at the expense of computational complexity and power/bandwidth usage for the
transmission of spectrum sensing information. The main advantage comes from
the fact that no central authority is required for making decisions and thus has
reduced cost. A distributed CR architecture for spectrum sensing is given by [61]
and various algorithms are discussed in [2]. The results show that the performance
of CR improves considerably through collaborative sensing [62].
3.2.4 External Sensing
In external sensing, an external agent performs the sensing and broadcasts the
channel occupancy information to cognitive radios. The main advantages are over-
coming hidden primary user problem and uncertainty due to shadowing or fading.
The spectrum efficiency is increased as the CR don’t spend time for sensing. Also,
it is power efficient as the sensing terminal need not be mobile and not necessar-
ily powered by batteries [2]. External sensing is one of the methods proposed for
identifying primary users in IEEE 802.22 standard [45].
3.3 How to Sense?
There are numerous methods proposed by various researchers on how to sense
the spectrum. The following sections first discuss some previous techniques used
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for spectrum sensing. Then spectrum sensing using machine learning, specifically
unsupervised learning, is explored in great detail.
3.3.1 Transmitter-based Sensing
Transmitter detection approach is based on the detection of the weak sig-
nal from a primary transmitter through the local observations of secondary users.
Three schemes are generally used for the transmitter detection. In the following
subsections, matched filter detection, energy detection, and cyclo-stationary feature
detection techniques are discussed.
3.3.1.1 Matched Filtering
A matched filter is an optimum receiver for an AWGN channel [63]. In cogni-
tive radios the matched filter is also an optimum method for detection of primary
user when transmitted signal is known [63]. However, one requires exact information
about signal transmitted, such as its bandwidth, operating frequency, and modula-
tion type. With the advantage of having the short time to achieve probability of
miss detection [64] the main disadvantage is its implementation complexity [52] and
before-hand knowledge of signal. This is still possible since most primary users have
pilots, preambles, synchronization words or spreading codes that can be used for
coherent detection [52]. Some examples are: TV signal has narrow-band pilot for
audio and video carriers; CDMA systems have dedicated spreading codes for pilot
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Figure 3.2: Schematic representation of the match filter detector.
[52]. Another disadvantage of match filtering is large power consumption as various
receiver algorithms needs to be executed.
A typical match filter detector for spectrum sensing is shown in Figure 3.2
[65]. Let the sample received signal y(n) at the CR user be
y(n) = θhp(n) + w(n), 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 (3.1)
where p(n) denote the pilot sequence, w(n) denote the white noise, h denote the
quasi-static block fading channel from the primary transmitter to the CR user, and









as the average power of the pilot signal. Then the instantaneous SNR within the























































































H1, if Y > λ
H0, if Y < λ
(3.6)
where the threshold λ is chosen to satisfy a target false probability. In order to keep
computation simple and mathematically tractable an AWGN channel is selected.
Under this assumption, it is shown in [65], the test statistics of the MF detector Y
follows a central chi-square distribution with two degree of freedom under H0 and a
non-central chi-square distribution with two degree of freedom and a non-centrality












based on which the false-alarm probability and the detection probability for a given
threshold can be obtained [65].
3.3.1.2 Energy Detector Based Sensing
A simple approach as compared to match filtering is to perform non-coherent
detection through energy detection (ED). The signal is detected by comparing the
output of energy detector with a threshold which depends on noise floor. It is one
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Figure 3.3: Schematic representation of the energy detector over a spectrum band
of interest.
of the most common way to sense the spectrum because of its low implementation
and computational complexities. Also, the receiver does not need to know any thing
about the received signal’s characteristics.
There are several drawbacks of energy detectors that might diminish their
simplicity in implementation. First, a threshold used for primary user detection is
highly susceptible to unknown or changing noise levels. Second, energy detector
does not differentiate between modulated signals, noise and interference. Since, it
cannot recognize the interference, it cannot benefit from adaptive signal processing
for canceling the interferer. Lastly, an energy detector does not work for spread
spectrum signals: direct sequence and frequency hopping signals, for which more
sophisticated signal processing algorithms need to be devised [52].
To detect the primary signal by the energy detector in AWGN channel is to









i(t) + w(t), H0 SignalAbsent
s(t) + i(t) + w(t), H1 SignalPresent
(3.8)
where y(t) is the received signal at the cognitive radio, s(t) is the transmitted signal
from the primary transmitter, i(t) is interference, and w(t) is the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN). H0 and H1 denote the hypothesis corresponding to the
32
absence and presence of the primary signal, respectively [65]. An energy detector
can be implemented as in Figure 3.3 [65, 66]. The spectral component on each
spectrum subband of interest is obtained from the fast Fourier transform (FFT) of
the sampled received signal. Then the test statistics of the ED is obtained as the






















|S(m) + W (m)|2, H1
(3.9)
where S(m) and W (m) denote the spectral components of the recieved primary sig-
nal and the white noise on the subband of interest in the mth segment, respectively.









H1, if Y > λ
H0, if Y < λ
(3.10)
where the threshold λ is chosen to satisfy a target false alarm probability. Once
λ is determined, the detection probability can be obtained [65]. In ED, processing
gain is proportional to FFT size N and observation/averaging time T. Increasing
N improves frequency resolution which helps narrow band signal detection. Also,
longer averaging time reduces the noise power thus improves SNR.
3.3.1.3 Cyclostationary-Based Sensing
Modulated signals are in general coupled with sine wave carriers, pulse trains,
repeating spreading, hoping sequences, or cyclic prefixes which result in built-in pe-
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riodicity. Even though the data is a stationary random process, these modulated
signals are characterized as cyclostationary, since their statistics, mean and autocor-
relation, exhibit periodicity. This periodicity is typically introduced intentionally in
the signal format so that a receiver can exploit it for: parameter estimation such
as carrier phase, pulse timing, or direction of arrival. This can then be used for
detection of a random signal with a particular modulation type in a background of
noise and other modulated signals.
Common analysis of stationary random signals is based on autocorrelation
function and power spectral density. On the other hand, cyclostationary signals
exhibit correlation between widely separated spectral components due to spectral
redundancy caused by periodicity [67]. The distinctive character of spectral redun-
dancy makes signal selectivity possible. Signal analysis in cyclic spectrum domain
preserves phase and frequency information related to timing parameters in modu-
lated signals [67]. As a result, overlapping features in the power spectrum density
are non overlapping feature in the cyclic spectrum. Different types of modulated
signals (such as BPSK, QPSK, SQPSK) that have identical power spectral density
functions can have highly distinct spectral correlation functions [52]. Furthermore,
stationary noise and interference exhibit no spectral correlation, thus differentiating
modulated signals, interference and noise in low signal to noise ratios [52].
Mathematically cyclostationary detection is realized by analyzing the cyclic
autocorrelation function (CAF) [68] of the received signal, or, equivalently, its two-
dimensional spectrum correlation function (SCF) [69] since the spectrum redun-
dancy caused by periodicity in the modulated signal results in correlation between
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widely separated frequency components [69]. Consider a typical digitally modulated




a(n)g(t− nTo − to) (3.11)
where To is the symbol period, to is an unknown timing offset, and g(t) is the shaping
pulse. For simplicity, assume that the sequence a(n) is stationary with zero mean
and variance σ2a; then the time-varying autocorrelation function (TVAF) of s(t) is
defined as
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and G(f) is the Fourier transform of g(t) [65].
The function Rα(τ) is called the CAF and α is called cyclic frequency. As
indicated in [70], the CAF at a given cyclic frequency α determines the correlation
between spectral components of the signal separated in frequency by an amount of
α. In general [69], the CAF of cyclostationary signals is nonzero only for integer
multiples of a fundamental cyclic frequency αo. For the signal model given in [71],
αo = 1/To. Thus, given To, the CAF can be utilized to determine the presence or
absence of the primary signal by evaluating the values of Rα(τ) at corresponding
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cyclic frequencies [65]. In addition to continuous time domain detection, cyclosta-
tionary detection can also be implemented in discrete time domain [65, 68]. Some
common cyclic frequencies for signals of practical interest are [72, 73]:
1. Analog TV signal: It has cyclic frequencies at multiples of the TV-signal hor-
izontal line-scan rate (15.75 KHz in USA, 15.625 KHz in Europe).
2. AM signal: x(t) = a(t)cos(2πfct + φo). It has cyclic frequencies at ±2fc.
3. Pulse modulated (PM) and frequency modulated (FM) signal:
x(t) = a(t)cos(2πfct + φ(t)). It usually has cyclic frequencies at ±2fc. The
characteristics of the spectral-correlation density (SCD) function at cyclic fre-
quency ±2fc depend on φ(t).
4. Digital-modulated signals are as follows:
(a) Amplitude-Shift Keying: x(t) =
∑
∞
n=−∞ anp(t− n△s − to)cos(2πfct + φo).
It has cyclic frequencies at k/△s, k 6= 0 and ±2fc + k/△s, k = 0,±1,±2, . . .
(b) Phase-Shift Keying: x(t) = cos[2πfct +
∑
∞
n=−∞ anp(t − n△s − to)]. For
BPSK, it has cyclic frequencies k/△s, k 6= 0 and±2fc+k/△s, k = 0,±1,±2, . . .
For QPSK, it has cycle frequencies at k/△s, k 6= 0.
3.3.1.4 Other Methods
Some other proposed spectrum sensing methods in the literature are based
on waveform sensing [74], radio identification [75], multitaper spectral estimation
[76], wavelet transform based spectral estimation [77], Hough transform [78], neural
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networks [7], statistical features based sensing [79], and time-frequency analysis of
the received signal [44].
3.3.2 Machine Learning-Based Sensing
Spectrum sensing techniques based on machine learning have shown promising
results over traditional spectrum sensing methods. Classification algorithms based
on machine learning techniques fall into one of to major categories: supervised
learning and unsupervised learning. In supervised learning, training data is fed
to the classifier a priori and the training data is annotated as to the class it falls
into. While this type of training often yields the most robust results, access to such
training data can often be impractical. On the other hand, unsupervised learning
does not need any training phase. By learning from signals encountered on the
fly, initial classification results can be more error prone, but as more and more
examples are seen, the classification engine can leverage the wealth of observed data
to robustly classify new signals. To work well, the signal statistics need to be linearly
separable to facilitate use of various clustering algorithms. Machine learning based
sensing techniques are discussed in the following sub sections.
3.3.2.1 Feature Based Signal Classification
Consider a system of machine learning where a series of signal values xn(t) are
presented to a signal classifier, whose goal is to determine whether xn(t) is a primary











Figure 3.4: Signal Feature Detector
and possibly even several adjacent bands, is off-limits to use by secondary users.
If xn(t) is a secondary user, then these bands may be shared by other secondary
users. This thesis looks at approaches that find the answer to this question in an
unsupervised manner, or without external expert help. It is these approaches that
are more flexible and in turn have more value as a signal classification technique.
Figure 3.4 shows a typical signal feature extractor. Signal features when com-
bined with SDR enables DSA applications. One can look at either the temporal or
spectral, or both, characteristics of the signal. Some of the signal features of interest
are given in the Table 3.1 [80]. These features can be extracted through the analysis
of cyclostationary features or the power spectral density (PSD) of the signals. The
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) can be used to transform the time-domain signal into
the frequency domain and thus the PSD of the signal can be estimated. PSD can
then be used to extract first-order spectral features such as the bandwidth, received
power, and the roll-off factor [80].
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Table 3.1: Examples Set of Signal Classification Feature
Signal Feature Feature Type




Standard Deviation of Amplitude Temporal
Standard Deviation of Phase Temporal
Standard Deviation of Envelope Amplitude Temporal
Standard Deviation of Change in Phase Temporal
Standard Deviation of Absolute Value of Change in Phase Temporal
Nth Order Moment/Cumulant of Amplitude Temporal
Nth Order Moment/Cumulant of Phase Temporal
A. Bayesian Theory Approach
Bayesian Theory of Decision (BTD) is a fundamental tool of analysis in ma-
chine learning. The fundamental idea in BTD is that the decision problem
can be solved using probabilistic considerations. The goal here is to distin-
guish between two classes: primary P and secondary S. Let C = [P, S] be the
set of classes. The correct decision Ĉn is made by maximizing the following
conditional probability:
Ĉn = arg max
C∈[P,S]
P (C|xn(t)) (3.14)
Using the Bayes rule, this is equivalent to:





Ĉn = arg max
C∈[P,S]
P (xn(t)|C)P (C) (3.16)
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Note that in equation (3.15), P (xn(t)) is not part of maximization and is
therefore removed in equation (3.16), it is just a normalization factor ensuring
that the sum of probabilities is one. The a priori probability P (C) can
be computed using prior knowledge of the breakdown between primary and
secondary users in a particular frequency band.
The a posteriori probability P (xn(t)|C) is more difficult to compute. In partic-
ular xn(t) is a vector of large dimension, and the joint probability distribution
across an arbitrarily large-dimension xn(t) and the two classes P and S is
difficult to compute.
B. Features Extraction
The a posteriori probability P (xn(t)|C) can be computed by first projecting
xn(t) into a features space using transform F : C
∞ → RN . This reduces the di-
mensionality of the problem by examining specific features of xn(t) rather than
xn(t) itself. Now, one can use a classification engine to compute likelihoods
LC(.) of the various classes. Specifically,
LC(F (xn(t))) ∝ P (F (xn(t)|C))
≈ P (xn(t)|C)
(3.17)
In unsupervised learning, one feeds a series of feature vectors Fn = F (xn(t))
into the classification engine, and it then outputs class P or S based on its
acquired knowledge. At no point one provides any annotated training data to
the classifier that helps it make decisions about which points belong to which
class.
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3.3.2.2 Classification Using Self Organizing Maps
Self organizing map (SOM) [27] is a commonly used algorithm for unsupervised
learning. Its a type of neural network where individual weights are evolved
to fit the input data. With this approach an input vector is presented to the
network and the output is compared with the target vector. If they differ, the
weights of the network are altered slightly to reduce the error in the output.
This is repeated many times and with many sets of vector pairs until the
network gives the desired output. A SOM learns to classify the training data
without any external supervision whatsoever. A SOM does not need a target
output to be specified unlike many other types of network. Instead, where
the node weights match the input vector, that area of the lattice is selectively
optimized to more closely resemble the data for the class the input vector is
a member of. From an initial distribution of random weights, and over many
iterations, the SOM eventually settles into a map of stable zones. Each zone
is effectively a feature classifier, so each graphical output is a type of feature
map of the input space. Any new, previously unseen input vectors presented
to the network will stimulate nodes in the zone with similar weight vectors.
Training occurs in several steps and over many iterations:
Learning Algorithm:
(a) Each node’s weights are initialized. Consider l number of neurons with
m dimensional weight vector wj = [w1, w2, ..., wm], where j = 1, 2, ..., l.
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Initialize the parameter t, which is a count of iterations:
t = 0
(b) Consider an m dimensional input vector x chosen at random from the
training set X = [x1, ...,xl] and presented to the lattice.
(c) Every node is examined to calculate which one’s weights are most like
the input vector. The closest weight vector to input vector, in terms of
distance, is commonly known as winning neuron denoted as
s(x) = arg minj‖x−wj‖2 (3.18)
(d) The radius of the neighborhood of the winning neuron is now calculated.
This is a value that starts large, typically set to the ’radius’ of the lat-
tice, but diminishes at each time-step. So typically each weight vector is
adapted according to:
∆wr = ǫ(t)h(d1(r, s))(x−wr) (3.19)
where:

















In equation (3.20), h(.) is a Gaussian neighborhood function and d1(r, s)
is a function that depends on the Eucledian distance between units r and
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s that are images of weight vectors wr and ws on the grid, respectively.
In equation (3.21), ǫi and ǫf correspond to initial and final values of the
learning rate and tmax is the total number of iterations. In equation
(3.22), σ(t) is time varying variance, by time varying it means that σ(t)
varies with number of iterations, and as the number of iteration increases
σ(t) decreases and thus the neighborhood shrinks. σ(t) is defined in
equation (3.22), where σi and σf correspond to initial and final variance
values.
(e) Each neighboring node’s (the nodes found in step 4) weights are adjusted
to make them more like the input vector. The closer a node is to the
winning neuron, the more its weights get altered.
(f) Increase the time parameter t:
t = t + 1
(g) If t < tmax go to step 2 [24, 81].
Imagine neurons ni located on a lattice in a one or two-dimensional space,
called map space. Let ni represent the location in that space of the neuron.
Each neuron has an associated weight vector wi ∈ R
N which is a point in
weight space. These neurons serve to map points from the N-dimensional
weight space to the low-dimensional map space. For each input feature vector
Fn, the first step in classification is to select the neuron with closest weight
vector. In particular,
ĵ = arg minj‖Fn − wj‖2 (3.23)
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Now, weight vectors of all neurons are updated, where the magnitude of the
the update is a function of the distance between the neuron and nĵ :
wi ← wi + ηnai,ĵ(Fn − wi) (3.24)
where ai,ĵ is an activation metric based either on Euclidean or link distance
(e.g. aii = 1, aij = 0.5 if i and j are neighbors, and otherwise aij = 0), and ηn




The definition of aij means that weight vector updates will most influence the
selected neuron and its neighbors. The definition of ηn means that the more
samples fed into the system, the less the system will update its weight vectors.
This damping effect allows convergence. The values ηo and τ affect this con-
vergence rate. Initial values for weight vectors wi can be selected randomly
using a uniform distribution, a rough approximation of the weight space prob-
ability distribution, or they can be selected based on initial feature vectors.
In particular, for this last approach assume feature vectors F1, F2 · · ·Fn are































From F one can compute its eigenvalues λ1, λ2, . . . λN and eigenvectors e1, e2, . . . , eN .
Assuming neurons are in a two-dimensional space, and given λj and λk are
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the two largest eigenvalues, ej and ek are the principle eigenvectors that span
a two-dimensional space best fit for the original N -dimensional data. For
lattice point ni one can compute its initial weight vector wi by taking ni’s
two-dimensional coordinate on the plane spanned by ej and ek and projecting
it into the higher-dimensional RN space. If the two signal classes P and S have
sufficiently separable signatures in the weight space RN , the weight vector of
map neurons in cluster together after . By looking at weight vector densities
across the lattice, the clusters can be identified, and decision boundaries can
be placed between them. For each new signal received, the map can be used
to classify it, while simultaneously updating itself with the new information.
Application of SOM for Spectrum Sensing:
This algorithm is useful for scanning an entire band of frequency of interest,
locating energy, and then using features from that energy to feed into an
untrained classifier. Since, this algorithm does not need any training data, the
spectrum sensing is performed in a quick and efficient manner.
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Chapter 4
Security in Cognitive Radios
Cognitive radio paradigm introduces entirely new classes of security threats
and challenges different than those frequently encountered in a traditional
wireless network. This is because of additional features the CR offers, such
as sensing, geolocation, spectrum management, access to policy database etc.
Each of these functions and processes need to be accessed for potential vul-
nerabilities, and security mechanism needs to be established. Thus, providing
security in a CR environment is far more challenging as compared to tradi-
tional wireless networks. However, this issue needs to be addressed in order
to make CR a long-term commercially-viable concept. This chapter discusses
the topics of wireless security in cognitive radio networks, delineating the key
challenges in this area. Some of the fundamental questions which arise in CR
security are [82]:
(a) What are the potential threats to a cognitive radio network?
(b) What are the potential attacks against cognitive radio network?
(c) What is the likelihood of these threats and attacks?
(d) What is the potential consequence of these attacks?
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Some of the fundamental blocks of communication security are availability, in-
tegrity, identification, authentication, authorization, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation. So besides providing typical traditional forms of security, cogni-
tive networks must provide enhanced security mechanisms for various cognitive
functions it supports. As with any other wireless network, the security of CR
at each layer is critical. Muhammad in [83] discusses CR security at the physi-
cal layer, data-link layer, network layer, transport layer, and application layer.
He also discusses some cross-layer attacks against CR networks. In this the-
sis, the focus is on spectrum sensing security. Ensuring the trustworthiness of
spectrum sensing process is an important problem that needs to be addressed.
This chapter first discusses some building blocks of security applicable to cog-
nitive radios, then spectrum sensing security is discussed in detail.
4.1 Building Blocks of Communication Security
In this section, some building blocks of communication security are introduced
and how these building blocks are applied in cognitive radio networks are
discussed.
4.1.1 Availability
One of the fundamental requirements for any communication device and/or
network is its availability for use at all times. Most of the attacks in com-
munications like the denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, jamming attacks, buffer
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over flow attacks on network queues are all targeted towards rendering the
network unavailable either temporarily or permanently [83]. In the case of
CRs, network availability means the ability of primary user and secondary
user to access the spectrum. For the primary user, availability refers to being
able to transmit in the licensed band without interference from the secondary
user. On the other hand, availability for secondary users is the existence of
chunks of spectrum where it can transmit without causing interference to pri-
mary user. Security mechanisms should ensure spectrum availability for both
primary and secondary users.
4.1.2 Integrity
Data in a network needs to be protected from malicious modification, insertion,
deletion, or replay. Integrity assures that the data received is exactly as sent
by an authorized entity. Data integrity is extremely important in wireless
networks, where unlike wired networks the wireless medium is easily accessible
to intruders. In a CR, data integrity means that only authorized primary and
secondary users are able to communicate [83].
4.1.3 Identification
Identification is one of the main security requirements for any communication
device. Every device must have a unique identifier. In a CR, the secondary
users must have a tamper-proof identification mechanism.
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4.1.4 Authentication
Authentication is assurance that the communication entity is the one that it
claims to be. The objective of authentication is to prevent unauthorized users
from gaining access to the system. From the service provider’s perspective,
authentication protects the service provider from unauthorized intrusions into
the system. In CR networks, there is an inherent requirement to distinguish
between primary and secondary users. Therefore, authentication can be con-
sidered as one of the basic requirements for cognitive radio networks [83].
4.1.5 Authorization
In DSA environment, secondary users are authorized to use the channel when
its not being used by the primary user or if white spaces are available. They
can use the spectrum conditioned that they won’t cause any interference to
the primaries’ transmission. If a secondary user (possibly malicious) is caus-
ing interference to primary user, it should be stopped. But, it is difficult to
pinpoint exactly which secondary user is causing interference and even more
so in a distributed setting [83].
4.1.6 Confidentiality
Confidentiality and integrity are linked very closely. While integrity assures
that data is not maliciously modified in transit, confidentiality assures that
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the data is transformed in such a way that it is unintelligible to an unautho-
rized (possibly malicious) entity. This is commonly done by ciphering and
encrypting the data with a secret key which is shared only with the recipient.
The error-prone and noisy nature of wireless channel poses a unique challenge
to both data confidentiality and integrity, since they rely on ciphers which are
sensitive to channel errors and erasures. This issue is even more pronounced
in CR networks, where the secondary user’s access to network is opportunistic
and spectrum availability is not guaranteed [83].
4.1.7 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation techniques [84] prevent either the sender or receiver from
denying a transmitted message. Therefore, when a message is sent, the receiver
can prove that a message was in fact sent by the alleged sender. Similarly, when
a message is received, the sender can in fact prove that the data received was
by the alleged receiver. In CR setting, if malicious secondary users violating
the protocols are identified, non-repudiation techniques can be used to prove
the misbehavior and disassociate/ban the malicious user from the network
[83].
4.2 Spectrum Sensing Security
An important feature of CR is its ability to sense the spectrum. It should
be able to distinguish primary user signals from the secondary user signals in
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a robust way. The secondary users are permitted to operate in the licensed
band only on a non-interference basis to primary users. Since wireless commu-
nication is of bursty nature, the usage of licensed spectrum bands by primary
user may be sporadic. So a CR must constantly monitor for the presence of
primary user signals in the current operating band and candidate bands. If a
secondary user detects the presence of primary user in the current band it must
vacate the band for the primary user and switch to one of the fallow bands.
On the other hand, if the secondary user detects the presence of an unlicensed
user, it invokes a coexistence mechanism to share spectrum resources [85, 86].
4.2.1 Primary User Emulation
In a hostile wireless environment a malicious user may modify the air inter-
face to mimic a primary user’s signal characteristics. This results in secondary
users identifying the malicious user as a primary user, thus, vacating occupied
spectrum band for the primary user. In this way the malicious user gets un-
rivaled access to the primary user’s spectrum band. In literature this kind of
attack against cognitive radio networks is considered as Primary User Emu-
lation (PUE) [87]. The PUE attack can be launched while the spectrum is
being sensed by energy detection or cyclostationary signal features are used
for primary user’s signals.
When energy detection is used, a secondary user can recognize other secondary
users but is unable to recognize primary user. So, when a secondary user
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detects a signal that it recognizes, it labels it as of secondary user; otherwise
it determines that signal is that of a primary user. The detection of primary
user’s signal is very simple using this approach. Thus, a selfish or malicious
secondary user can easily exploit the spectrum sensing process.
When cyclostationary feature detection is used, in which intrinsic characteris-
tics of primary user’s signals are used to distinguish from those of secondary
users, an attacker can still make its signals indistinguishable from primary
user signals by transmitting signals that have same characteristics as primary
signals. If an attacker uses such a mechanism, CR that receive the signal will
falsely identify the malicious user’s (attacker) signal as that of primary user.
The aim of PUE attacks is to disrupt the communication and use the spectrum
resources that could have been used by legitimate secondary users. Depending
on the motivation behind attack, Ruiliang et al in [87] classify them as either
a selfish PUE or a malicious PUE attack.
• Selfish PUE Attacks: In this attack, an attackers objective is to maxi-
mize its own spectrum usage. When selfish PUE attackers detect a fallow
spectrum band, they prevent other secondary users from competing for
that band by transmitting signals that emulate the signal characteristics
of primary user signals. This attack is most likely to be carried out by
two selfish secondary users whose intention is to establish a dedicated
link [87].
• Malicious PUE Attacks: In this attack, the objective is to obstruct
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the DSA process of legitimate secondary users i.e. prevent legitimate sec-
ondary users from detecting and using fallow licensed spectrum bands,
thus causing denial of service. Unlike a selfish attacker, a malicious at-
tacker does not necessarily use fallow spectrum bands for its own commu-
nication purposes. It is quite possible for an attacker to simultaneously
obstruct the DSA process in multiple bands by exploiting two DSA mech-
anisms implemented in every CR. The first mechanism requires a CR to
wait for a certain amount of time before transmitting in the identified
fallow band to make sure that the band is indeed unoccupied. The sec-
ond mechanism requires a CR to periodically sense the current operating
band to detect primary user signals and to immediately switch to another
band when such signals are detected. By launching a PUE attack in mul-
tiple bands in a round-robin fashion, an attacker can effectively limit the
legitimate secondary users from identifying and using fallow spectrum
bands [87].
In order to mitigate these attacks against spectrum sensing, Ruiliang et al in
[87] propose a transmitter verification scheme, called localization-based defense
(LocDef ), which utilizes both signal characteristics and location of the signal
transmitter to verify primary signal transmitters. The localization scheme
utilizes an underlying wireless sensor network (WSN) to collect snapshots
of received signal strength (RSS) measurements across a CR network. By
smoothing the collected RSS measurements and identifying the RSS peaks,
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transmitter location is estimated.
4.2.2 Attacks Against Cooperative Sensing
Another form of security threat occurs when using cooperative spectrum sens-
ing [55]. Although cooperative spectrum sensing has promising advantages in
terms of accurate sensing of the spectrum, but, if a CR reports false informa-
tion the whole system may be jeopardized in a way that too many incorrect
sensing decisions would occur thus increasing the likelihood of false detection.
It is challenging to devise robust algorithms for cooperative spectrum sensing
which are attack proof.
4.2.3 Threats Against Self-Coexistence Mechanisms
The coexistence between primary (incumbent) users and secondary users is
referred to as incumbent coexistence. On the other hand, coexistence between
secondary users in different wireless radio access network (WRAN) cells is
referred to as self-coexistence [88]. Self-coexistence mechanisms are needed
in overlapping coverage areas of CR networks to minimize self interference
and utilize spectrum efficiently. Unfortunately, adversaries can modify/forge
self-coexistence control packets to exploit self-coexistence mechanisms, which
can result in drastic reduction of network capacity. What makes the task of
protecting self-coexistence control packets, using conventional cryptosystems,
difficult is the need to use an inter-operator key management system. It is
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likely that the networks that contend for spectrum (via self-coexistence mech-
anisms) will be managed by different wireless service operators. Designing and
maintaining an inter-operator key management system could be complex and
expensive [87].
4.3 Other Security Threats in CR Networks
In addition to spectrum access-related security threats, software-centric signal
processing by (software-based) CR systems also raises new security implica-
tions. For instance, the download process of the radio software needs to be
secured. Moreover, the radio software itself needs to be tamper resistant once
it is downloaded on the radio terminal so that software changes cannot be




Security Threats in Machine Learning based Spectrum Sensing
The DSA is an emerging technology which can solve the problem of spectrum
scarcity. Machine learning can be used to improve the performance and ro-
bustness of DSA [31]. Previous work shows the sensitivity of cognitive radios
against emulation attacks [87, 89]. In supervised or unsupervised machine
learning environment a malicious user can manipulate the feature extractors
and classifier engines to affect their output and thus results in the misclassi-
fication of the intended signals [80, 90]. Chapter 4 discussed importance of
security when using machine learning for DSA. Here the focus is on the role of
security in an unsupervised machine learning environment and this thesis ex-
plores some possible types of security vulnerabilities against signal classifiers.
5.1 Threats to Self Organizing Maps
This section deals with a generic self-organizing map whose goal is to distin-
guish between two classes. First, analytical derivation of the feasible set of
input signals that would inductively manipulate the decision regions is done,
and then a more complex example through simulation is demonstrated.
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5.1.1 Analytical Derivation
Consider, for simplicity, a one-dimensional map. After n − 1 iterations from
previous input data, the weight vectors for neurons ni are wi, respectively, are
updated. Our goal is to create an input vector xn(t) that will cause a neuron
currently on the border between two classes to switch classes. Applying this
technique inductively, an attacker can arbitrarily shift the decision region be-
tween primary and secondary users, causing more signals to be classified as
primary, decreasing competition for spectral resources. Lets assume neurons
n1, . . . , nl are linearly arranged and evenly spaced, and without loss of gener-
ality, ni = i. Assume nodes n1, . . . , nl−i are classified as primary users, and
nodes ni, . . . , nl are classified as secondary users. Our goal is to cause ni to be
classified as a primary user. To accomplish this, the input signal must have a
feature vector closer to wi than any other weight vector. This introduces our
first constraint:
‖F (xn(t))− wi‖2 < ‖F (xn(t))− wj‖2 ∀ j 6= i (5.1)
where wi and wj are the i-th and j-th weight vectors, respectively. In other
words, xn(t) must have a feature vector that causes ni to be the winning
neuron. Let χ1 be the space of feasible vectors xn(t) that satisfy this space.
Next, the map will update the weight wi, and the goal is for this update δi to
cause neuron ni to shift from being classified as secondary to primary. However
this update also affects ni’s neighbors. For ni and its neighbors, the update is
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defined as
δj = ηnaj,i(F (xn(t))− wj) (5.2)
Assuming activation values of 1 for the winning neuron, 0.5 for its neighbors,
and 0 for all other neurons, the result is following:
δi−1 = 0.5ηn(F (xn(t))− wi−1) (5.3)
δi = ηn(F (xn(t))− wi) (5.4)
δi+1 = 0.5ηn(F (xn(t))− wi+1) (5.5)
If ni is on the decision boundary and currently in the same class as ni+1, it
must be closer in weight space to ni+1 than ni−1. To change this behavior, the
new weight vector need to be closer to ni−1. Quantitatively, this means
‖(wi + δi)− (wi−1 + δi−1)‖2 < ‖(wi + δi)− (wi+1 + δi+1)‖2 (5.6)
substituting equation (5.5) into equation (5.6) results in
‖(1− ηn)wi − (1− 0.5ηn)wi−1 + 0.5ηnF (xn(t))‖2
< ‖(1− ηn)wi− (1− 0.5ηn)wi+1 + 0.5ηnF (xn(t))‖2 (5.7)
This is the second constraint. Let χ2 be the feasible set of signals xn(t) that
satisfy this constraint. If χ1 ∩ χ2 6= φ, then a signal exists that will alter the
decision boundaries.
5.2 Simulation Scenario
The three types of attacks explored in this thesis, connection attack, point-
cluster attack, and random noise attack, are defined in the following sections.
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(a) Connection Attack
The connection attack aims to link two signal classes together by the use
of chaff signals. The purpose is to confuse the signal classifier and force
it to draw inaccurate decision boundaries. So chaff points are added
which have means collinear with µ1 and µ3, and are added at random
points in between the two. Their goal is to confuse the classifier and
case points with mean µ3 to be in the same output class as points with
mean µ1, rather than µ2. This confuses the signal classifier and it draws
boundaries showing adversarial user to be the primary user and all others
to be secondary user, thus showing that in a self-organizing map the
decision boundaries can be manipulated by an adversary if it presents
known feature values.
(b) Point Cluster Attack
In the point cluster attack many chaff points are added all in one place, the
idea is to confuse the signal classifier and force it to draw decision bound-
aries showing adversarial user to be the primary user. This approach is
successful, since in many classification algorithms, say, K-means, the goal
is to try to find the center which is the mean position of all the samples in
the class. The presence of many chaff points at a particular point drags
the mean of adjacent classes closer to itself. In practice if too many sig-
nals are produced with the same statistical properties the signal classifier
can be forced to term this one as a single independent class and all other
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classes to be a second class. Thus an adversary producing large amount
of signals can learn the environment of cognitive radio thus compromising
the security of the primary user.
(c) Random Noise Attack
In the random noise attack chaff points are added randomly all over the
map space. The idea is to confuse the signal classifier so that it draws the
decision boundaries randomly, because after the training phase the the
randomly added chaff signals will try to get close to the already present
signals thus forming small clusters of neurons in the weight space close
to them. The randomness in the decision boundaries is in the sense that
some times it classifies adversarial user to be the primary user and some-
times it draws boundaries accurately. Through simulation it is shown
that this type of attack is also strong enough to confuse the signal clas-
sifier and thus, when effective, draws inaccurate decision boundaries.
5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
This section demonstrates the efficacy of the attack on features generated from
real signal data. Signal features which are consistent with real signal, namely
standard deviation of time-domain signal, standard deviation of time-averaged
time-domain signal, and the standard deviation of the derivative of the signal
are used. It is assumed that the primary user is a frequency-modulated (FM)






































Figure 5.1: (a) Weight vectors in a 3-dimensional weight space. (b) Neuron densities
in a 3-dimensional density space.
versary users are 16-point quadrature amplitude modulation (16-QAM) [34].
This thesis starts the discussion by explaining the significance of results in
the presence of no attack, connection attack, and point cluster attack in both
adjacent and equilateral adversaries case. Finally the random noise attack and
its significance in the two different cases of adversarial users is explained. This
thesis shows numerically the error rates for adjacent adversaries and equilat-
eral adversaries in the presence of no attack, connection attack, point cluster
attack, and the random noise attack. This thesis also demonstrates the rela-
tionship between the strength of the attacks on the signal classifier and the
number of chaff signals.
In order to demonstrate the efficacy of decision boundary movement for a
self organizing map with a two-dimensional map space this thesis uses the
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MATLAB Neural Network Toolbox to implement the self-organizing maps.
The Monte Carlo simulation executes the following scenario 200 times and
averages the final result in order to show misclassification rates. The reason
to run the simulation 200 times and not more is that after a certain number of
training the weight vectors do not change much and a certain optimal training
threshold is achieved.
A network with a two-dimensional map space and three-dimensional weight
space is created. The weight space could be arbitrarily large, but for the pur-
poses of visualization, three dimensions were used. The weight space spans
values [0, 10] in each dimension. Input data samples are taken from two Gaus-
sian distributions. The means of the two Gaussian distributions are chosen in
such a way so that in one set the adversaries are adjacent to each other and
in the other they are equidistant.
Adjacent Adversaries:
µ1 = (3,3,3), µ2 = (7,7,7), µ3 = (5,8,7)
Equilateral Adversaries:
µ1 = (3,3,3), µ2 = (4,7,5), µ3 = (5,3,7)
where µ1, µ2 and µ3 correspond to the means of primary, secondary, and
adversarial users respectively. The standard deviation is 0.25. The network is
first trained to input samples, this case uses training data of 600 samples, and
then runs the classification algorithm and determines primary and secondary
users through the decision boundary algorithm. The input points are shown
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as blue dots in Figure 5.1(a). The network is trained to the input samples
and neuron weights are shown in red. The associated neuron densities are
depicted in Figure 5.1(b). There is a clear decision boundary in dark blue
that separates the primary from secondary users.
5.3.1 Performance of Signal Classifiers
In an unsupervised learning environment, the signal classifiers are very sen-
sitive to an attack because they update themselves when new data arrives
so an adversary can manipulate the output of the classifier in the long run
[80]. This thesis used SOM as a signal classifier and K-means and hierarchical
clustering algorithms. For K-means, K = 2 is used for two classes of primary
and secondary users, in the hierarchal algorithm classification on the basis of
weighted, average, complete, single and ward algorithms was explored. The
’weighted’ uses the weighted average distance, ’average’ uses the unweighted
average distance, ’complete’ uses the furthest or largest distance, ’single’ uses
the shortest distance, ’ward’ uses the inner squared distance among the weight
vectors in the two clusters, note that this thesis takes into account only the
Euclidean distance and the hierarchical tree structure is monotonic. The per-
formance of these algorithms is evaluated under no attack. Table 5.2 gives
the statistics with adjacent adversaries. Notice that the ’single’ hierarchical
algorithm is more prone to attack since even under no attack it draws incor-
rect decision boundaries 6% of the time. Table 5.1 evaluates the performance
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Table 5.1: Performance of Classification Algorithms under No Attack with equilat-
eral adversaries
Classification Algorithm Pri→Sec Sec→Pri Adv→Pri
K-means 0 0.56 0.30
Weighted 0 0.54 0.44
Average 0 0.84 0.16
Complete 0 0.90 0.10
Single 0 0.68 0.56
Yard 0 0.70 0.30
with equilateral adversaries, keeping in view the average performance of these
algorithms under this situation one finds that K-means and ’weighted’ per-
form better and are less prone to attack on the average as compared to other
classification algorithms used. This work uses these two classification algo-
rithms, K-means and weighted, in order to evaluate their performance under
no attack, connection attack, point cluster attack and random noise attack.
5.3.2 No Attack
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 gives a general overview of how K-means behaves in the
case of adjacent adversaries and equilateral adversaries, respectively, with no
attack. K-means is able to accurately draw boundaries for the primary and
secondary users under no attack. Table 5.4 shows that the K-means signal
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Table 5.2: Performance of Classification Algorithms under No Attack with adjacent
adversaries
Classification Algorithm Pri→Sec Sec→Pri Adv→Pri
K-means 0 0 0
Weighted 0 0 0
Average 0 0 0
Complete 0 0 0
Single 0 0.06 0.06
Yard 0 0 0
classifier is highly successful in drawing accurate decision boundaries under
no attack with adjacent adversaries but with equilateral adversaries the per-
formance of K-means degrades and it classifies adversary user to be primary
user 35% of the time (see Table 5.5) [35]. So even under no attack the false
positive rate is much high for K-means under the equilateral adversaries case.
The weighted hierarchical clustering algorithm performs much like K-means
when used with adjacent adversaries (see Table 5.6), but with equilateral ad-
versaries it has a high false positive rate as compared to K-means under similar
situation (see Table 5.7) [35].
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Table 5.3: Adv→Pri error rates for different attack densities using hierarchical clus-
tering with equilateral adversaries
Attack Type 0 200 400 600
Point Cluster 0 0.91 0.96 0.98
Connectivity 0.44 0.52 0.58 0.81
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Figure 5.3: Weight vectors and neuron densities for equilateral adversaries without
an attack present
Table 5.4: Error types and rates for different attack types using K-means clustering
with adjacent adversaries
Error Type None Connect Cluster Noise
Pri→Sec 0 0 0 0
Sec→Pri 0 0 0.35 0
Adv→Pri 0 0 0.38 0
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5.3.3 Connection Attack
The connection attack aims to confuse the signal classifier by presenting signal
features similar to that of primary user. This attack uses chaff signals which
have means collinear with the means of primary user and adversarial user.
Actually it demonstrates that if the adversarial user knows signal features
of primary user this type of attack can be launched against signal classifiers
[34]. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the connection attack in the case of adjacent
and equilateral adversaries, respectively [35]. Observe the chaff signals which
are added to fool the signal classifier. Compare Figures 5.4(b) and 5.5(b)
with Figures 5.2(b) and 5.3(b). Notice the decision boundaries before attack,
Figures 5.2(b) and 5.3(b), and after attack, Figures 5.4(b) and 5.5(b). The
alteration in the decision boundaries of primary and adversary user shows
the efficacy of the connection attack. Next, the performance of K-means and
weighted algorithms under adjacent and equilateral adversaries is evaluated.
Tables 5.4 and 5.6 show that connection attack has no impact on clustering
algorithms with adjacent adversaries, however, Tables 5.5 and 5.7 show that
with equilateral adversaries the connection attack has high error rate. The
connection attack is more powerful if weighted algorithm is used because then
it will classify adversary to be primary 75% of the time but with K-means the
error rate is 36%. So it makes sense to use that clustering algorithm which is
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Figure 5.4: (a) Connection attack when adjacent adversarial user adds chaff signals.
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Figure 5.5: (a) Connection attack when equilateral adversarial user adds chaff sig-
nals. (b) Neuron density map after the connection attack.
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Table 5.5: Error types and rates for different attack types using K-means clustering
with equilateral adversaries
Error Type None Connect Cluster Noise
Pri→Sec 0 0 0 0
Sec→Pri 0.38 0.33 1 0.36
Adv→Pri 0.35 0.36 1 0.58
5.3.4 Point Cluster Attack
The point cluster attack in the adjacent adversaries case is shown in Figure 5.6.
Notice the location of the cluster of chaff points. The chaff points are added
with mean (9,9,9) and its adjacent signals have means (5,8,7) and (7,7,7),
the classification algorithm lumps these three into a single class because of
their close proximity where as the signal class with mean (3,3,3) are classified
as the other class. The neuron density map has a dense region showing the
presence of many chaff points. Figure 5.7 shows the point cluster attack in the
equilateral adversaries case. The means of the signals in this case are (9,9,9)
for chaff signals, and the other three signals have means (3,3,3), (4,7,5) and
(5,3,7). Notice the chaff signals are far from the other signals in the weight
vector map as compared to the adjacent adversaries case. Tables 5.4 and 5.6
suggest that weighted algorithm performs better under point cluster attack
with adjacent adversaries as the error rate it produces is much lower than K-
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Figure 5.6: Weight vectors and neuron densities for adjacent adversaries under the
point cluster attack
K-means under this attack. Also, Tables 5.5 and 5.7 show that the weighted
algorithm outperforms K-means with equilateral adversaries. Its interesting
to note that K-means completely fails to draw decision boundaries accurately
whereas the weighted algorithm is some-what successful but still has a 98%
error rate.
5.3.5 Random Noise Attack
The random noise attack case is a special case in which the signals generated
have means which are randomly generated using a uniform distribution, in
terms of neural networks this corresponds to neurons all over the weight vector
space. Due to the random nature of these signals the signal classifier finds it
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Figure 5.7: Weight vectors and neuron densities for equilateral adversaries under
the point cluster attack
classifier to locate the mean of the samples when they are randomly distributed
over the space of signals so it draws the decision boundaries arbitrarily.
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show the weight vectors and the neuron density map when
a random noise attack is performed on the adjacent and equilateral adversaries
cases respectively. Note that the chaff signals are randomly distributed over
the weight space. After the training phase, they get aligned more close to
the three classes depending upon the orientation of their weight vectors. The
neuron density map shows the two decision regions. Notice that the darker
and more dense areas correspond to our signal classes whereas the less dense
areas are the result of the random chaff signals located arbitrarily. Every
time the decision boundary algorithm runs on this attack it tries to find the
best mean taking in account the random chaff signals present around original
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Table 5.6: Error types and rates for different attack types using hierarchical clus-
tering with adjacent adversaries
Error Type None Connect Cluster Noise
Pri→Sec 0 0 0 0
Sec→Pri 0 0 0.10 0.38
Adv→Pri 0 0 0.11 0.39
classes and splits the decision region into primary and secondary user. Ta-
ble 5.4 shows that the random noise attack has no effect on K-means with
adjacent adversaries but if weighted algorithm is used then poor decision re-
gions are obtained as shown by Table 5.6. Table 5.5 shows that in the case of
equilateral adversaries this attack is successful on K-means. A comparison of
random noise attack in equilateral adversaries case shows that its difficult to
conclude whether K-means is a good algorithm for drawing decision boundary
for primary and secondary users as compared to the weighted algorithm, since
in both cases the error rates are very close.
5.3.6 Effect of Chaff Points
It is interesting to note the behavior of signal classifiers under the point cluster
attack and random noise attack with adjacent and equilateral adversaries by
changing the number of chaff signals. The intensity of attack increases with
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Figure 5.9: Weight vectors and neuron densities for equilateral adversaries under
the random noise attack
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Table 5.7: Error types and rates for different attack types using hierarchical clus-
tering with equilateral adversaries
Error Type None Connect Cluster Noise
Pri→Sec 0 0 0 0
Sec→Pri 0.30 0.16 0.85 0.40
Adv→Pri 0.42 0.75 0.98 0.55
of chaff points the clustering algorithms can be forced to draw inaccurate
decision boundaries and thus increasing the probability of error. Table 5.3
demonstrates that the strength of the attack increases regardless of its type
as the number of chaff signals is increased. In Table 5.3 the numbers 0, 200,
400 and 600 correspond to no chaff points, one-third chaff points, two-third
chaff points and full chaff points, respectively. These are derived according to
number of signal points with which network is trained i.e. 600 signal points are
used to train the network and then chaff points are added accordingly. Observe
that the most strong attack comes out to be the point cluster attack, as it has
high probability of error of classifying adversary user to be the primary user
as compared to connection and random noise attack.
5.4 Real Signals: An Example
This section demonstrates the efficacy of the attack on features generated from






















Figure 5.10: Weight vector (neuron) map for BPSK, 16QAM and FM signals
analog primary signal from the digital secondary signals. It is assumed the
primary user is a frequency-modulated analog signal, secondary users are bi-
nary phase-shift keying (BPSK) and adversarial users are 16-point quadrature
amplitude modulation (16QAM). While many different types of feature ex-
tractors are possible, this work selected three that were simple to compute
and could be implemented as simple finite impulse response (FIR) filters. The
first feature is the standard deviation of the time-domain signal itself. The
second feature is the standard deviation of the time-averaged time domain
signal, averaged over 10 samples. The third feature is the standard deviation
of the derivative of the signal. In the end standard deviation of signals filtered
with taps [1], [0.1, 0,1, ... , 0.1], and [1,-1] is computed. For the simulation,
this thesis included small, random sampling and carrier frequency offsets of
the input signals, consistent with an oscillator stability of 20ppm.
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Figure 5.11: Density map for BPSK and 16QAM signals (notice the clear decision
boundary between primary and secondary users)
stabilities of 50ppm and 2ppm [91]. It was also assumed the signal SNR has
been normalized to approximately 10 dB, and included a scaling variance of
0.1. These random fluctuations in the input signal increase the variance of the
input signal feature distributions in weight space. Figure 5.10 shows the self-
organizing map that was trained to our signal inputs. The three classes are
discernible, though the BPSK and 16QAM classes are close in weight space. In
the associated density plot, boundaries are present between all three classes,
but the strongest boundary is between the FM signals and the BPSK/16QAM
signals. This result is an extension of [31] and demonstrates it is feasible to
use neural networks with unsupervised learning and simple features to classify
signals. The next experiment, demonstrates that the attacker can create input
signals to manipulate the neuron structure. By fabricating signals with the

























Figure 5.12: PSK signal is now a separate class, discernible from FM/QAM class
be lumped in with the FM signals. Given that with the exception of the
computation of standard deviation, the feature transforms are linear, so the
following rough approximation is used.
F (x1(t) + x2(t)) ≈ F (x1(t)) + F (x2(t)) (5.7)
Therefore, if in order to create chaff points to connect two signal classes, one
simply needs to take random linear combinations of their time-domain signals.
In particular if xFM(t) is the time-domain representation of our primary signal,
and xQAM(t) is the time-domain representation of our adversarial secondary
users, then one can create many signals that will generate the appropriate
chaff by computing the following for random δ ∈ unif(0, 1).
xchaff (t) = δxFM(t) + (1− δ)xQAM(t) (5.8)
Figure 5.12 shows this attack. Note that due to the non-linearity of the stan-
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Figure 5.13: Chaff signals connecting two different signal classes i-e FM and 16-QAM
signals, making them as one separate class in the density map
and 16-QAM clusters, but they achieve their end goal, none the less. In fact,
the round-about nature of the points demonstrates the ability to create trails
of chaff points that go around other clusters in feature space. With this at-
tack, this thesis demonstrated the ability to manipulate decision boundaries
and cause clusters of signals to be misclassified in a deterministic way. This
results in a primary user emulation attack where the secondary user need not





In the simulations above, there were always two classes i.e. the classification
algorithm considered primary to be primary and all others to be secondary
and grouped them in one class. In reality there are more than two classes
as there can be more than one secondary user. That means each user will
have its own cluster in the feature space. In this situation, a single boundary
separating primary and secondary users is not helpful, in fact, it is problematic
and confusing for the signal classifiers. So, if the estimate of number of classes
is accurate the attacks against the signal classifier can be avoided, as in this
way knowledge about number of classes would be available and a malicious
user won’t be able to fool the signal classifier. X-means algorithm [92] can
be used to estimate the number of classes, or users, present. This algorithm
would be more robust against signal classifier attacks as compared to K means
itself [93].
The attacks against signal classifiers can also be thwarted if the secondary users
know their own signal parameters and primary’s signal parameters. Now, if
the primary and secondary classes are known, the secondary users can use
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this information to perform a sanity check of the output of the unsupervised
clustering algorithm. For example, it could detect primary and secondary user
classes being collapsed down via a point cluster attack, and modify the ap-
proach used in performing the clustering. In many cases, this could simply be
re-execution of the clustering algorithm. This approach could further decrease
the misclassification rates in case of point cluster and connection attacks [93].
6.2 Conclusion
The use of signal classifiers and clustering algorithms for DSA has opened new
frontiers of research in this area. There is a strong need to explore other types
of signal classifiers and decision boundary algorithms which are less prone to
attacks, more robust and efficient for DSA.
This thesis explored three types of attacks against signal classifiers. Self-
organizing map (SOM) was used as signal classifier and K-means and weighted
hierarchical clustering algorithm as decision boundary algorithms. First, it
was shown analytically that this kind of attacks are possible for a simpler
(one-dimensional) case. Then, more complex cases were simulated in Matlab.
Simulations demonstrated the effectiveness of connection, point cluster, and
random noise attack against signal classifiers. This demonstrated the fact that
machine learning environment can be easy to manipulate by an adversary
user, since if it can learn by the environment it can also be taught by the
environment. So, a PUE attack can be launched very easily in this case.
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